Aboutness: Towards Foundations for the Information Artifact Ontology by Ceusters, Werner & Smith, Barry
  1 
Aboutness: Towards Foundations for the  
Information Artifact Ontology 
Barry Smith 1,* and Werner Ceusters 2 
1 Department	of	Philosophy,	University	at	Buffalo,	126	Park	Hall,	Buffalo,	USA	
2	Department	of	Biomedical	Informatics,	University	at	Buffalo,	921	Main	Street,	Buffalo,	USA		
	
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The	 Information	 Artifact	 Ontology	 (IAO)	 was	 created	 to	 serve	 as	 a	
domain‐neutral	resource	for	the	representation	of	types	of	information	
content	entities	(ICEs)	such	as	documents,	data‐bases,	and	digital	 im‐
ages.	We	identify	a	series	of	problems	with	the	current	version	of	the	
IAO	 and	 suggest	 solutions	designed	 to	 advance	 our	understanding	 of	
the	relations	between	ICEs	and	associated	cognitive	representations	in	
the	minds	of	human	subjects.	This	requires	embedding	IAO	in	a	larger	
framework	of	ontologies,	including	most	importantly	the	Mental	Func‐
tioning	 Ontology	 (MFO).	 It	 also	 requires	 a	 careful	 treatment	 of	 the	
aboutness	relations	between	ICEs	and	associated	cognitive	representa‐
tions	and	their	targets	in	reality.	
1 INTRODUCTION  
At the heart of the IAO is the term ‘Information Content 
Entity’ (ICE), which is currently defined as follows:  
INFORMATION CONTENT ENTITY =def. an ENTITY which is 
(1) GENERICALLY DEPENDENT on (2) some MATERIAL 
ENTITY and which (3) stands in a relation of ABOUTNESS 
to some ENTITY.  
An ICE is thus conceived as an entity which is about some-
thing in reality and which can migrate or be transmitted (for 
example through copying) from one entity to another. In 
what follows we introduce and defend proposals to improve 
this definition and the IAO as a whole. 
The relation of generic dependence was introduced into 
BFO 1.1 in order to capture the fact that some dependent 
entities – for example the dependent entity which is the pat-
tern of ink marks in your copy of the novel War and Peace 
(a complex quality in BFO terms) – are able to migrate from 
one bearer to another (e.g. through use of a photocopier). 
Generic dependence can thus be defined as follows: 
a generically depends on b = def. a exists and b exists 
and: for some universal B, b instance_of B and neces-
sarily (if a exists then some B exists)  
In BFO 1.0 the migration of dependent entities from one 
bearer to another was excluded. Dependence was seen as 
amounting in every case to specific dependence, or in other 
words as a relation which obtains between one entity and 
another specific entity when the first is of its nature such 
that it cannot exist unless the second also exists. A smile is 
dependent in this sense on a certain specific face, a head-
ache on a certain specific head, a charge on a certain specif-
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ic conductor. Generic dependence, in contrast, obtains 
where the first entity is dependent, not on some specific 
second entity, but rather merely on there being some second 
entity of the appropriate type (Smith et al. 2015). A DNA 
sequence is generically dependent in this sense on some but 
not on any specific DNA molecule; a pdf file on some but 
not on any specific memory store; and so on. 
A generically dependent entity is in each case concre-
tized (see definition in section 5) in some specifically de-
pendent entity (more specifically in some BFO:quality). For 
example, this DNA sequence is concretized in this specific 
ordering (pattern) of nucleotides in this particular molecule; 
this sentence is concretized in this pattern of ink marks on 
this piece of paper (or also in this pattern of neuronal con-
nections in the brain of the subject who reads it). The term 
‘pattern’ can thus be understood in two senses – as referring 
either (i) to what is shared or communicated (between origi-
nal and copy, between sender and receiver), or (ii) to the 
specific pattern before you when you are reading from your 
copy of Tolstoy’s novel.  
We can now define: 
INFORMATION QUALITY ENTITY (IQE) =def. a QUALITY 
that is the concretization of some INFORMATION 
CONTENT ENTITY (ICE) (Smith et al., 2013), 
noting that IQEs are called ‘information carriers’ in the cur-
rent version of IAO.  
All concretizations are qualities in the BFO framework. 
Such qualities can serve as the basis for dispositions. When 
we concretize a lab test order by reading the text of the or-
der on our screen, then in addition to the mental quality that 
is formed in our mind as we read the text, there is also a 
disposition to be realized in our actions of carrying out the 
relevant test. This disposition may come into being simulta-
neously with the mental quality created through our under-
standing of the text, but it is still dependent on this quality, 
as is shown by the fact that the latter may exist even in the 
absence of any accompanying disposition. 
We define ‘artifact’ and ‘information artifact’ as follows: 
ARTIFACT =def. a MATERIAL ENTITY created or modified 
or selected by some agent to realize a certain FUNCTION 
or ROLE (Examples: a key, a lock, a screwdriver) 
INFORMATION ARTIFACT =def. an ARTIFACT whose func-
tion is to bear an INFORMATION QUALITY ENTITY. (Ex-
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amples: a hard drive, a traffic sign, a printed form, a 
passport, a currency note, an RFID chip, a SIM card) 
As a matter of definition, therefore, all information artifacts 
are material entities. While every ICE is dependent upon 
some material entity that is its bearer ICEs themselves are 
not material entities.  
In reflection of the needs it was originally designed to ad-
dress, the IAO is focused deliberately on ICEs associated 
with information artifacts – above all scientific publications 
and databases – thus with information entities which are 
continuants in BFO terms. No less important, however, is 
the occurrent side of the informational coin, which is made 
up of those processes – above all acts of thinking, speaking, 
hearing, writing and reading – through which ICEs are cre-
ated, understood, and communicated. Given that thinking 
and speaking pre-dated writing, we know that acts of these 
sorts existed long before there were any information arti-
facts. They are of crucial importance to the ontological 
treatment of the phenomenon of aboutness because it is they 
which provide the relational tie between representations and 
their targets in reality. 
If, therefore, we are to deal with these more fundamental 
aspects of the information pipeline, then we will need to 
embed the IAO into a wider framework of ontologies. This 
would include, on the one hand, all existing domain ontolo-
gies, which can be seen as representing the portions of reali-
ty about which we have information – they are ontologies of 
the various families of targets of aboutness. More im-
portantly here, however, it would include on the other hand 
the Mental Functioning Ontology (MFO), which is designed 
to provide the resources to describe different types of cogni-
tive acts, including those cognitive acts as a result of which 
ICEs are created (Ceusters & Smith, 2010). 
2 ABOUTNESS AND PORTIONS OF REALITY 
Aboutness corresponds to what is otherwise referred to by 
means of the expressions ‘reference’ or ‘denotation,’ 
(Yablo, 2014) but generalized to include not merely linguis-
tic reference but also the relations of cognitive or intentional 
directedness that are involved, for instance, when a nurse is 
measuring a patient’s pulse rate or a doctor is observing a 
rash on a patient’s thigh. These processes are about, respec-
tively, a pulse and a rash. When the nurse enters the string 
72 beats per minute in the medical chart of the patient, then 
there is an ICE that is concretized in the ink (or pixel) pat-
tern exhibited on the chart, which inherits its aboutness from 
the aboutness of what we shall call the nurse’s direct cogni-
tive representation of the pulse. The latter is a (binary) rela-
tional quality; it links the nurse causally to the target of his 
observations. It is on this basis that, by entering data, he 
creates an ICE that is also tied relationally to its target in 
reality. Thus the ICE is not an abstract entity analogous to a 
‘proposition’ in logical parlance. Rather it is a created, his-
torical entity that is marked by the feature of indexicality: its 
aboutness and its rootedness in time and context are analo-
gous to those of an instruction issued by someone who 
points his index finger and says ‘go there now.’  
The current IAO definition of ICE can account for the 
aboutness involved in many examples of these sorts. How-
ever, we believe that it falls short when it comes to more 
complex cases. In (Ceusters, 2012) we proposed broadening 
the definition of ICE to require ‘aboutness to some portion 
of reality’ rather than just ‘to some entity,’ in order to allow 
the domain of the aboutness relation to include inter alia  
 universals, for instance in the ICE concretized by the 
string there are no instances of dinosaur which survive, 
 relations, for instance in the ICE concretized by the 
string the part-whole relation is transitive,  
 other ICEs, for instance when someone asserts that 
what someone else just stated is true, and 
 configurations, for instance in the ICE concretized by 
Barack Obama is the current President of the USA 
– none of which is an entity in BFO terms.  
The last example on this list is not only about Barack 
Obama but also about his role of being President of the 
USA and about the USA itself. But it is not only about these 
entities taken singly; in addition, it is about how the three 
entities are related to each other in a certain interval of time, 
and about the entire portion of reality – the configuration – 
made up by all of these together. This configuration is as-
serted to exist by a human subject using the corresponding 
sentence in a specific sort of context and with a specific sort 
of associated cognitive quality. But it can also be referred 
to, for instance when someone makes a second-order asser-
tion using a nominalized expression, as in: That Barack 
Obama is President of the USA is of epoch-making signifi-
cance.  
3 INFORMATION AND MIS-INFORMATION 
We can on this basis address another issue with IAO’s cur-
rent definition of ICE, which is that it does not give us a 
clear way of doing justice to the distinction between infor-
mation on the one hand and what we might call mis-
information on the other. Consider the ICE concretized in 
the sentence Barack Obama was never President of the 
USA, written on some piece of paper in 2015. This ICE is 
indeed about Barack Obama, the USA, and so forth. But 
what it communicates about these entities is something that 
is false. Our amended definition of ICE can allow us to ac-
cept that both information and mis-information exist, but 
also to recognize that the latter is not a special type of the 
former (that what some people might call ‘false infor-
mation’ is not a special type of information, any more than a 
cancelled oophorectomy is a special type of oophorectomy). 
We achieve this by using our generalized definition of ICE 
to formulate a view according to which the relation of 
aboutness between a composite (for example sentential) ICE 
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and the associated portions of reality can obtain (or fail to 
obtain) simultaneously on two (or in principle more than 
two) levels: first, on the level of simple referring expres-
sions such as ‘Barack Obama’ and ‘USA’; and second, on 
the level of more complex expressions such as sentences 
and their nominalizations.  
A true sentence on the upper level is about a correspond-
ing configuration (where the term ‘configuration’ is to be 
understood in a way similar to the way ‘fact’ or ‘obtaining 
state of affairs’ are understood by some philosophers 
(Wittgenstein, 1961)). We can now capture the fact that a 
given compound expression may inherit aboutness from 
some or all of its constituent simpler referring expressions 
but fail in its claim to aboutness (and thus to convey infor-
mation) when taken as a whole.  
If someone writes on a piece of paper the sentence 
Barack Obama is President of Russia, then there is an ICE – 
concretized by this written string and by any copies made 
thereof – which is generically dependent on the piece of 
paper and which is about (on the aforementioned lower lev-
el) Barack Obama, his being president, and Russia. But this 
ICE is not about any corresponding configuration, simply 
because there is no corresponding configuration. It is for 
this reason that the given sentence, while it is about certain 
entities in reality, is nonetheless not true of those entities. 
This strategy can be used also to explain how a fictional 
sentence such as Sherlock Holmes was a user of cocaine, 
can concretize an ICE – by inheriting aboutness from one or 
more of its components (here for example the string cocaine, 
which is about a corresponding universal) – even though the 
sentence as a whole is not about anything in reality. 
A related problem with the current IAO is that it does not 
provide us with the resources to do justice to what happens 
with certain types of ICE when what they are about changes 
over time. The problem here is that the ICE concretized by 
the sentence Barack Obama was never President of the USA 
written on a piece of paper in 2007 was true when it was 
written; yet it appears that this very same sentence, when 
read by some observer in 2009, would be false.  
This appearance is misleading, however, for it is not the 
case that the ICE in question changes in the intervening pe-
riod. Rather, what has changed is the first-order reality that 
this ICE claims to be about. Certainly as a result of these 
changes in first-order reality there came into existence many 
new ICEs relevant to Obama, the presidency and the USA, 
with many new concretizations. But the original ICE, with 
its original concretization born with its original act of crea-
tion, must nonetheless still be evaluated as true. This is be-
cause, as in the case of the nurse’s data entry above, the ICE 
in question has its time of origin baked into it through the 
indexicality of the was in was never President.  
We shall presuppose in what follows that information ar-
tifacts do not bear information in and of themselves, but 
only because cognitive subjects associate representations of 
certain sorts with the patterns which they manifest. We thus 
view the aboutness that is manifested by information con-
tent entities in accordance with the doctrine of the ‘primacy 
of the intentional’ (Chisholm, 1984), according to which the 
aboutness of those of our representations formulated in 
speech or writing (or in their printed or digital counterparts) 
is to be understood by reference to the cognitive acts with 
which they are or can in principle be associated. The entry 
72 beats per minute is about what it is about because of 
what the nurse himself directly observed when he measured 
the patient’s pulse (or, in the case where the ICE is created 
by sensor devices automatically adding data to the chart, it 
is about what the nurse would have observed in the given 
circumstances). 
At higher levels we may have ungrounded representa-
tions, as illustrated for example in the letter published by 
Urbain Le Verrier in 1859 (Le Verrier, 1859) in which there 
appears an intended reference to a planet that is asserted to 
be intermediate between Mercury and the Sun, a planet 
which in 1860 Le Verrier baptised ‘Vulcan’. This intended 
reference depended on a certain belief on Le Verrier’s part 
in the existence of an intra-Mercurial planet. When we un-
derstand Le Verrier’s text today, however, then we have a 
different sort of cognitive representation – involving what 
we refer to below as a recognized non-referring representa-
tional unit (RNRU) – in which this intended reference to a 
planet has been cancelled.  
Such changes in our understanding of the reference of 
terms are of course a common phenomenon in the world of 
ontology, and specifically in the world of ontology version-
ing. Paying careful attention to these changes forms the ba-
sis for the strategy for ontology evaluation we have outlined 
in (Ceusters & Smith, 2006). 
4 REPRESENTATION AND REFERENCE 
We build on the notions of representation and representa-
tional unit informally introduced in (Smith et al., 2006). A 
representation is there described as an idea, image, record, 
or description which refers to (is of  or about), or is intend-
ed to refer to, some entity or entities external to the repre-
sentation. Note that ‘representation’ is thus more compre-
hensive in scope than ‘ICE,’ even on our proposed more 
inclusive definition of the latter, since an ICE must in every 
case be about some portion of reality, where the aboutness 
in question must always be veridical, so that ‘being about’ is 
a success verb. A representation, in contrast, is required 
merely to intend to be about something, and this intention 
might fail (as when a child draws what she thinks of as a 
unicorn).  
We provided a formal definition of ‘representation’ along 
these lines in (Ceusters & Smith, 2010): 
REPRESENTATION =def. a QUALITY which is_about or is 
intended to be about a PORTION OF REALITY (POR). 
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We can now single out cognitive representations (represen-
tations of the sorts instantiated in the brains of beings like 
ourselves) by means of the terms: 
MENTAL QUALITY =def. a QUALITY which specifically 
depends on an ANATOMICAL STRUCTURE in the cognitive 
system of an ORGANISM. 
COGNITIVE REPRESENTATION =def. a REPRESENTATION 
which is a MENTAL QUALITY. 
defined in the Mental Functioning Ontology. We are here 
attempting to remain neutral as concerns the precise nature 
of cognitive representations; thus it does not follow from the 
definitions that such representations involve something like 
images; nor does it follow that they must all be conscious 
representations. 
As concerns occurrents in the realm of cognition, it is 
clear that mental processes, too, for example processes of 
thinking or imagining or remembering, may be about or be 
intended to be about some portion of reality. We hypothe-
size, however, that such occurrent representations are al-
ways such as to inherit their intended aboutness from some 
underlying continuant representation. When the doctor sees, 
and recognizes, for example, that there is a rash on her pa-
tient’s leg, then her act of recognition coincides temporally 
with the beginning to exist of a correspondingly targeted 
(relational) mental quality on her part (Smith, 1987).  
As we saw above, cognitive representations may be 
more or less complex. When analyzed into their constituent 
parts, however, then we arrive at what we called ‘represen-
tational units’ (RUs), defined as the smallest constituent 
sub-representations, including icons, names, simple word 
forms, or the sorts of alphanumeric identifiers we might find 
in patient records. (Smith et al., 2006) 
Subtypes of representational unit can then be defined as 
follows (Ceusters & Smith, 2010):  
1. Referring representational unit (RRU): an RU which is 
both intended to be about something and does indeed 
succeed in this intent.  
2. Non-referring representational unit (NRU): an RU 
which, for whatever reason, fails to be about any-
thing.  
3. Unrecognized non-referring representational unit 
(UNRU): an NRU which, although non-referring, is 
intended and believed to be about something; 
4. Recognized non-referring representational unit 
(RNRU): an NRU which was once intended and be-
lieved to be about something, but which, as a result 
of advances in knowledge, is no longer believed to be 
so;  
5. Representational unit component (RUC): a component 
of a representation that is not intended by the arti-
fact’s authors to refer in isolation; 
RU ‘Paris’ 
NRU ‘Atlantis’ 
UNRU ‘Vulcan’ (as used by Le Verrier in 1860) 
RNRU ‘Vulcan’ (as used now when referreing to Le Verri-
er’s error) 
RUC ‘Le’ (as it appears in the third row of this table) 
Table 1: Examples of types of representational unit 
Note that, as the ‘Vulcan’ case makes clear, classifications 
of representations under headings 1. to 5. may change with 
time. Note, too that, while items 2. to 5. on this list signify 
one or other kind of shortfall from aboutness, representa-
tions under item 1. include the fundamental (grounding, 
target-securing) cases of direct cognitive representation 
referred to in the case of the nurse taking someone’s pulse 
as in our example above. 
5 PROPOSAL 
5.1 Primitives and elucidations  
To do justice formally to the foregoing we propose the fol-
lowing primitive relational expressions. These cannot be 
defined, but only elucidated by means of examples and in-
formal specifications of their meanings. 
x is_about y means:  
x refers to or is cognitively directed towards y. Do-
main: representations; Range: portions of reality. Axi-
om: if x is_about y then y exists (veridicality). 
x concretizes y at t means:  
x is a QUALITY & y is a GENERICALLY DEPENDENT 
CONTINUANT  
& for some material entity z, x specifically_depends_on 
z at t & y generically_depends_on z at t  
& if y migrates from bearer z to another bearer w then a 
copy of x will be created in w.  
x is_a_direct_cognitive_representation_of y means:  
x is a COGNITIVE REPRESENTATION in some subject s  
& x is_about y & x comes into existence, as a result of a 
causal process initiated by y and in a way appropriate to 
y, in the cognitive system of s. Example: a causal pro-
cess of visual perception initiated by an object present-
ed visually to s. 
5.2 Definitions 
x is_a_representation_of y =def. x is a REPRESENTATION 
& x is_about y (where y is a portion of reality). Note 
that not all representations are about something. 
x is_conformant_to y =def. x is an INFORMATION QUALITY 
ENTITY & y is a COGNITIVE REPRESENTATION & there is 
some GDC g such that x concretizes g and y concretizes 
g. Example: x is a sentence on a piece of paper, y is the 
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belief of the author of the sentence who wrote the sen-
tence as an expression of her belief, and g is the ICE 
(the content) that belief and sentence share.  
6 DISCUSSION 
Although it is a requirement that the target of aboutness be a 
portion of reality (POR), there is no requirement that the 
relevant POR exists at the time when the associated cogni-
tive representation exists. Thus a patient can contemplate a 
past disorder, for instance by regretting his not having ac-
cepted the advice of some clinician. His thoughts are then 
about that very disorder, and not for example about his 
memories thereof. This is so independently of whether the 
nature of the disorder is known to him or not. 
There is also no requirement that the agent of a veridical 
representation knows what the portion of reality is that his 
representation is about: even a baby, or a cat, may see a 
flow cytometer. We can directly represent an object even 
though we are ignorant of or mistaken about what universal 
it instantiates.  
There is also – as is illustrated by the case of believers in 
the Higgs boson before there was evidence for its existence 
– no requirement that aboutness must imply that the subject
knows that what he is representing exists – he must merely 
believe that it exists.  
Although neuroscience, to our best understanding, is not 
yet sufficiently advanced to provide answers to the question 
what the precise physical basis of a mental quality exactly is 
– for example whether it is certain spatial configurations of
one or more molecules in one or more brain cells – we be-
lieve that the following hypothesis is correct: that an ana-
tomical structure in which there can inhere a mental quality 
need not always have a mental quality inhering in it (in this 
respect having a mental quality is comparable to having the 
quality of being pregnant and is to be contrasted with quali-
ties such as height and mass, given that something in which 
there can inhere a height or a mass must always have a 
height or mass of some determinate sort). From this, it is 
then just a short step to the question of whether there can be 
unconscious representations, a question which, however, we 
must here leave aside for reasons of space. 
7 CONCLUSION 
IAO was designed to deal with information artifacts, which 
is to say with continuants such as the information stored in 
hard drives or formulated in written sentences or in printed 
texts – thus with information that is shareable between mul-
tiple bearers, including bearers existing at different times. 
As will by now be clear, the IAO must be embedded in a 
broader framework of ontologies, including the Mental 
Functioning Ontology (Hastings et al., 2012). In the future 
we must address for example how an agent can use sight 
(or, in the case of Braille, touch) to process concretization in 
such a way as to generate mental representations that are 
conformant to the associated ICEs. For this we will require a 
Language Ontology – extending the Ontology of Document 
Acts proposed in (Almeida, et al. 2012) – that will allow us 
to do justice to the ways in which sentences can be not 
merely believed and thought but also asserted, heard, seen 
(for example in the case of sign language), understood, and 
formulated in written or printed texts.  
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